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Laboratory experiments are the gold standard in many social sciences: translate an 
event or other phenomenon into an experimental paradigm involving imagined “scenarios” or 
carefully scripted interactions, manipulate one or more “independent variables,” and observe 
the effects on “dependent variables.” Such experimentation has helped us understand many 
aspects of everyday life. 
But horrifying and overwhelming events defy the possibility of creating laboratory 
analogues. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are a vivid example. Even today, the 
mere phrase 9/11 evokes vivid memories—in those who experienced them directly, but also 
in the hundreds of millions of people who watched them (often over and over) on television 
screens. For studying such an unexpected and unprecedented catastrophic event, 
experimentation may not be useful. For example, consider the following thought experiment: 
Imagine it is September 10, 2001 and you are conducting a psychological experiment in 
lower Manhattan. Having instructed your participants to “imagine that two airplanes have just 
hit and demolished the towers of the World Trade Center,” you then ask them “What will you 
do?”  Would their hypothetical responses be at all comparable to how they would actually act 
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of such “world historic” events should begin with narratives and archives, tracing the 
manifold personal, interpersonal, and structural processes that went before and came after.  
This is just one reason why New York after 9/11, edited by Susan Opotow and 
Zachary Baron Shemto, is especially welcome. The book is a collection of scholarly articles 
from a wide variety of disciplines (psychology, sociology, trauma medicine and psychiatry, 
emergency management, public safety, environmental health, architecture, human rights, and 
law).  The common focus is how the attacks and their aftermath affected New York City: its 
people, the texture of its urban life, and its memorialization of 9/11 in architecture and 
personal memory. Both specialists interested in an overview of a specific topic, and general 
readers looking for a broad account of long-term the impact of that terrible day and the 
resilience of those who experienced it directly, will find this book helpful and rewarding.  
Two introductory chapters, by the editors and Patrick Sweeney, lay out themes that 
unite the diverse chapters: continuum of “moving on” (at the extreme, denial) versus 
“memory” (at the extreme, obsession); practicality versus emotion; and the power of money 
versus a pluralism of perspectives.  
Hirofumi Minami and Brian Davis use the linking phrase “Ground Zero” to compare 
9/11 with another “unspeakable trauma”—Hiroshima after the 1945 US atomic bombing. 
They develop a “psychoanalysis of cities” to understand suppressed memories, survivor 
identity, collective healing, and the politics of memorialization in both cities.  
The chapters by Daniel Libeskind (architect of the master plan for reconstruction) and 
Michael Arad (designer of the 9/11 Memorial) give fascinating accounts of how these 
concerns played out in details of design: for example, how to bring the city into the site, or 
how to place individual victims’ names on the memorial panels. These chapters present an 
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Opotow and Karyna Pryiomka carry these themes forward in their account of the 
design and contents of the underground September 11 Memorial Museum. Who would have 
thought that a reinforced concrete “slurry wall”—built in 1966 as part of the original World 
Trade Center construction to hold back the Hudson River and never intended to be visible to 
the public—would become a key artifact in that museum? Or that a description of its crucial 
role in 9/11—“it had stood its ground when everything around it was collapsing” (p. 237)—
could move a reader to tears?  Any visitor realizes that the WTC site has become not only a 
place of memorial and tourist pilgrimage, but also a “living part of the city” (99) that brings 
together diverse groups of people—business commuters going to work, nearby neighbors 
who have “resettled” lower Manhattan after 9/11, schoolchildren, and ordinary people 
relaxing and reflecting.  
The chapter by Norman Groner recounts improvements in safety codes for tall 
buildings since 9/11. Unfortunately, the same story cannot be told about other aspects of 
security. Writing on “urban security,” Charles Jennings concludes that inter-agency rivalries, 
bureaucratic inertia, politics, tight funds—forces that increased destruction and hampered 
rescues on 9/11—are alive and well in New York City, making urban life more fragile than it 
need be.  
Even more distressing is the chapter by Michael Crane and 9 others on “Health 
impacts of 9/11.”  It now seems clear that much advice circulated to the public shortly after 
9/11 was designed to avoid panic and get back to “normal” as quickly as possible, but at the 
cost of minimizing risks and thus exacerbating negative health effects.  One example can 
stand for many: a New York City Health Department advisory circulated shortly after 9/11 
(reproduced on page 152) contains the astonishing assertion that “Pregnant women and young 
children do not need to take additional precautions.” Psychologists studying “trust in 
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examples of public evasion, misrepresentation, denial, and simple lies. How would we expect 
citizens to react to such a government? 
The record on PTSD effects of 9/11 is complex, but the chapter by Ari Lowell and 
five others lists studies that identify different risk factors for different populations (people 
with high exposure, first responders, utility workers, community members) and highlight 
protective effects of social support. Gaps in the data (e.g., lack of follow-up, few recent 
studies of affected children) suggest priorities for future catastrophe policy.   
After 9/11, the New York Police Department took it upon itself to begin systematic 
surveillance of Muslim residents, often coercing them to spy on each other. The chapter by 
Diala Shamas concludes that there is no evidence that this program was effective or even 
produced criminal leads; yet it had major effects on its targets—especially sense of trust, self-
disclosure, and social development among young Muslims. (It is interesting that Saudi 
Arabian Muslims were not a particular focus of police surveillance, since 15 of the 19 
hijackers of 9/11 were Saudi nationals.) 
Readers old enough to remember September 11 may find their emotions stirred by a 
particular phrase or image that suddenly arouses some memory of that long-ago day. And so 
the book itself, beyond being a guide to many historical and social science literatures of 9/11, 
is also a site of memory.  
